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Evaluating Juveniles' Competence to Make
Abortion Decisions: How Social Science
Can Inform the Law
PRESTON A. BRITNER, SUZANNE J. LAFLEUR, AND
AMY J. WHITEHEAD t
Under current legal standards, adolescents in the United States are pre-
sumed to be incompetent to make medical decisions. A traditional concep-
tualization of children as the property of their parents has resulted in children
under the age of majority not being recognized as persons in their own
rights.1 Although several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have begun to
extend constitutional rights to minors in some domains, in most domains,
adolescents remain incompetent in the eyes of the Court. Thus, they are unable
to enter into most medical treatment contracts.2 One exception to the pre-
sumption of incompetence originated with the Supreme Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth, which first extended
abortion rights to minors in the post-Roe v Wade (1973) era.? However,
notwithstanding Danforth's holding that minors possess privacy rights regard-
ing reproduction, Danforth also maintained that not all minors are competent
t. Preston A. Britner is Assistant Professor at the University of Connecticut's School
of Family Studies. He received his Ph.D. (1996) and M.A. (1993) from the University of
Virginia, and his B.A. (1990) from the University of Miami. Suzanne J. LaFleur is
Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at Smith College. She received her
Ph.D. (1996) and M.A. (1993) from the University of Virginia and her B.A. (1990) from
College of the Holy Cross. Amy J. Whitehead is an M.A. candidate in the Department
of Child Development at Tufts University. She received her B.A. from Smith College in
1997.
1. L.A. Weithom, Developmental Factors and Competence to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 5 Child & Youth Servs 85, 85-86 (1982).
2. T. Grisso and L. Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Per-
spective, 9 Professional Psychology 412, 413 (1978).
3. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976). See also
Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973).
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to make such decisions. Access to abortion is now increasingly restricted for
minors, as a majority of states have recently passed parental notification or
consent laws, emphasizing presumptions that adolescents are incompetent.4
Parallel to the increasing restrictions on the reproductive rights of juveniles,
justified in part by their presumed incompetence, states are increasingly trying
juvenile delinquents as adults in criminal courts. In this latter context, minors
who are 14 to 17 years of age (or even as young as 10) are presumed to be
accountable for their actions, competent to stand trial, and liable to be
sentenced as adults. In one recent study of sentencing, a majority of mock
jurors were willing to impose the death penalty for a 10, 16, or 17-year-old
defendant in a capital case, although these mock jurors were more likely to
support execution for a 19-year-old adult.' This disparity in standards for
competence across legal domains underscores the political climate of contempo-
rary legal policy and highlights the difficulty of defining "competence" and
applying such a definition, both within any one domain as well as across
domains.
Adolescents' access to abortion is a wide-reaching public policy issue.
Approximately 40 percent of teenage pregnancies end in abortion, and 33
percent of all abortions are performed on women under the age of 20.6 What
makes a teenage girl competent to make a decision about whether to have an
abortion or instead to care for the fetus prenatally, give birth to a child, and
perhaps raise that child? The adolescent's decision-making competence and
privacy rights must be balanced with the best interests of the teen herself, the
fetus (and, prospectively, the child), and the teen's family (especially to the
extent that the teen's parents or other family members would be financially
and emotionally involved in the pregnancy or in the rearing of the teen's
child). The need for such balancing makes these decisions complex, important,
and emotionally charged. In this Article, we will set aside the moral debate on
the ethics of abortion. Instead, we will work within the current legal frame-
work, post-Roe v Wade, and attempt to discuss ways in which psychological
and family systems research can inform decision-making and the law with
regard to minors' access to abortion.
A number of presumptions involving family autonomy, minors' decision-
making abilities, and legal notions of individualized justice have influenced
judicial opinions regarding the informed consent doctrine in this domain. In
this Article, these presumptions and the current tests of competence to consent
4. National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL), Who
Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion and Reproductive Rights at vi (NARAL
Found, 1995). See also G.H. Wilmoth, ed, Psychological Perspectives on Abortion and Its
Alternatives: Research and Policy, 48 J Social Issues (special issue 1992).
5. C.A. Crosby, et al, The Juvenile Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An
Empirical Investigation of Societal Consensus and Proportionality, 19 L & Human Beh
245 (1995).
6. N.F. Russo, Adolescent Abortion: The Epidemiological Context, in G. B. Melton,
ed, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological and Legal Issues 40 (Nebraska 1986).
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to medical treatment will be critically analyzed. Psychological research on the
cognitive abilities of minors to make informed consent decisions and conclu-
sions regarding adolescents' abilities reached by researchers will be discussed.
Additionally, research regarding the various developmental factors that have
been hypothesized to influence adolescent "judgment" in decision-making situ-
ations will be outlined. After noting the limitations of current research and
outlining suggestions for future research in the area of adolescents' competence,
this paper will review both legal case history regarding minors' access to
abortion as well as recent research specific to adolescents' competence in
abortion-decision contexts. The paper will conclude with specific legal recom-
mendations regarding restrictions on juveniles' access to abortion, guided by
the current state of the relevant research.
Legal Presumptions
The child-family-state triad and the notion of individualized justice are two
general issues in mental health law that substantially affect minors. These
issues are important in the consideration of adolescent decision-making
competence and must be considered early in the formulation of research
questions.7
THE CHILD-FAMILY-STATE TRIAD
When there is a question regarding access to medical treatment for an adult,
the focus is usually on the relationship of the individual to the state. The debate
is usually framed in terms of the proper imposition of the state's parens patriae
power over individual autonomy. When minors are involved, however, the
interests and capacities of the parents are also a central concern. The effect of
policy and case law must be assessed in a broader framework, with simultaneous
consideration given to the individual minor's rights, to parental rights and family
integrity, and to the state's duties and powers. Moreover, not only must re-
searchers appreciate this interdependent triad of interests maintained by the
minor, the family, and the state, but they must also recognize their own predis-
positions and biases with regard to these interests! For example, one might
adhere to any of the following three perspectives regarding these interests.
The first perspective regarding the child-family-state triad is the "family
libertarianism" perspective, which emphasizes parental rights and family privacy.
This perspective maintains that parents should be autonomous in raising their
children and in making medical decisions for them. Thus, parents often continue
7. E.P. Mulvey and P.A. Britner, Research on Law and Mental Health Issues Affecting
Minors, in B.D. Sales and S.A. Shah, eds, Mental Health and Law: Research, Policy and
Services 319 (Carolina Academic 1996) ("Law and Mental Health Issues").
8. Id at 320; E.P. Mulvey, N.D. Reppucci, and L.A. Weithorn, Mental Health, Law,
and Children: A Brief Overview, in N.D. Reppucci, et al, eds, Children, Mental Heath,
and the Law (Sage 1984) ("Mental Health, Law, and Children").
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to have the final word in medical decisions for their adolescent children based
upon the presumption that the parents will act in the best interests of their
children and that adolescents are incapable of making important choices for
themselves.' Writing for the majority in Parham v J.R., Chief Justice Burger
wrote that the law presumes, in its conceptualization of the family, "that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for life's difficult decisions." ° Justice Douglas first discussed the
possibility of incompatible interests of parents and children in his dissent in
Wisconsin v Yoder, where the Court upheld the right of Amish parents to edu-
cate their children at home in their own tradition."
The "state interventionist" perspective has also played an important role in
protecting the health interests of children who cannot protect themselves. 2
Drawing on its parens patriae power, the state may in some cases override paren-
tal refusals to consent to life-saving treatment. Justice Caldecott, in the California
Court of Appeals decision In re Phillip B., wrote that parental autonomy was
subject to restriction and that the state was justified in intervening in order to
protect the sanctity of human life. 3 In most cases that were not life-threatening
to the child, parental autonomy has prevailed over state attempts to intercede for
the benefit of the child. However, the state may successfully intervene in situa-
tions that are not life-threatening to the child if the parents are influenced by
factors other than the child's best interest, such as in decisions involving tissue
donation or mental commitment. 4 The state interventionist position, though
somewhat weakened by the rights afforded minors in cases following In re
Gault, continues to be supported by many health care professionals and
others.s This perspective, however, has focused on the best interest of the child,
without much regard for the child's competence to make his or her own medical
choices, especially insofar as the majority of cases involving state intervention
have thus far related to infants and young children. 6
The third perspective on the child-family-state triad, the "children's rights
position," emphasizes the importance of extending to minors some of the same
treatment decision rights enjoyed by adults. Arguments for this position have
been based on the demonstrated competence of some minors and on the limited
constitutional protections and rights to privacy that the Supreme Court and
9. Mulvey, Reppucci, and Weithorn, Mental Health, Law, and Children (cited in note
8).
10. Parham v J.R., 442 US 584, 602 (1979).
11. Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972).
12. See Mulvey, Reppucci, and Weithorn, Mental Health, Law, and Children (cited in
note 8).
13. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal App 3d 796, 156 Cal Rptr 48 (1979).
14. P.I. Carter and J.S. St. Lawrence, Adolescents' Competency to Make Informed
Consent Birth Control and Pregnancy Decisions: An Interface for Psychology and the Law,
3 Beh Sci & L 309 (1985).
15. See In re Gault, 387 US 1 (1967).
16. W. Gaylin, The "Competence" of Children: No Longer All or None, Annual Prog
in Child Psychiatry & Child Development 507 (1983).
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tribunals have extended to minors over the past 30 years.17 With respect to
adolescent access to contraception and their right to control abortion decisions,
the Court has weighed parental autonomy against the privacy rights of "mature"
minors. Some states have also established individual exceptions to allow "ma-
ture" minors the ability to consent to medical procedures.18 Although courts
have recognized that minors do possess limited legal rights, the question of how
to determine whether the adolescent is "mature" enough to give competent in-
formed consent has not been effectively addressed. 9
INDIVIDUALIZED INTERVENTION
The juvenile justice, child welfare, and mental health systems are traditional-
ly and presently grounded in the notion that state action regarding minors and
their families should be based more on the needs of the actors involved than on
the act that warrants state intervention. In this "individualized intervention" ap-
proach, each case "presents the potential for a unique combination of factors
that judges, mental health professionals, and juvenile justice and child welfare
personnel should consider in formulating a plan tailored to that situation.""
This individualized approach is facilitated by providing professionals with
broad discretion to deal with the situations that confront them and by using
vaguely defined guidelines. Broad prescriptive mandates, such as the charge to act
"in the best interest of the child," provide the flexibility for professionals to
make innovative, individualized intervention possible. However, this reliance on
vague requirements has also been reflected in a "blurring of treatment and
retributive metaphors when discussing legal intervention in this area."2 The
flexibility of individualized intervention has brought with it vague guidelines,
inadequate evaluation, and inconsistency in how minors are "protected" versus
"held accountable" for their actions across decision domains.
As investigations have become more scientific and empirical, social science
has become more central to the formulation of legal policy. These disciplines
should inform legal practitioners and theorists about whether their idealized view
of how the world works matches the one reflected by empirical evidence. In
order to evaluate the rights of adolescents in medical treatment situations, it is
necessary to examine the framework and tests currently used to determine
adolescents' competence in this domain.
17. Mulvey, Reppucci, and Weithorn, Mental Health, Law, and Children (cited in note
8); Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs at 87 (cited in note 1).
18. J. Areen, Legal Constraints on Social Research with Children, in B. Stanley and
J.E. Sieber, eds, Social Research on Children and Adolescents 7 (Sage 1992).
19. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14).
20. Mulvey and Brimer, Law and Mental Health Issues at 322 (cited in note 7).
21. Id.
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The Informed Consent Framework
EVALUATING COMPETENCE
"Competence" is a term that often subsumes the three conditions necessary
for a legally valid medical treatment decision. An informed decision must be
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Although these aspects may
rightly be considered separately, they are often used synonymously by judges.'
In general, an individual must have certain abilities, skills, experience, and
understanding regarding the nature of a particular situation and its consequences
in order to be considered competent. 3 Adults are presumed to have the capacity
to comprehend the ramifications of a medical decision to the extent that a
"reasonable" person would understand the procedure; minors, on the other
hand, are presumed incompetent and must demonstrate such understanding.24
Competency is a legal rather than a medical or psychological concept, and it
requires an individual determination for each specific instance; global competency
determinations have been rejected by the legal system."5 A variety of factors
may be relevant, and various tests may be applied to a situation. In the words
of Roth, Meisel, and Lidz, "The search for a single test of competency is a search
for a Holy Grail."
2 7
TESTS OF COMPETENCE
In the interest of protecting the autonomy of individuals making treatment
decisions, tests of competence to give informed consent have focused on the
process of decision-making rather than on the outcomes of the decision.28 Roth,
Meisel, and Lidz enumerate five tests of competency commonly reported in the
literature.2 9 These tests look at: the evidence of a choice, the reasonable out-
come of a choice, rational reasons for the choice, the individual's ability to
understand, and the individual's actual understanding.
According to the "evidence of choice" standard, a competent individual must
be able to make a choice between available treatment options; the quality of the
22. Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 416 (cited in note 2).
23. L.H. Roth, A. Meisel, and C.W. Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treat-
ment, 134 Am J Psychiatry 279 (1977); Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs at 89 (cited in
note 1).
24. A. Meisel, L.H. Roth, and C.W. Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 134 Am J Psychiatry 285 (1977).
25. B. Freedman, Competence, Marginal and Otherwise: Concepts and Ethics, 4 Intl J
L & Psychiatry 53, 56 (1981). See also Meisel, Roth, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 285
(cited in note 24).
26. N.K. Rhoden, The Presumption for Treatment: Has It Been Justified?, 13 L Medi-
cine & Health Care 65 (1985).
27. Roth, Meisel, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry at 283 (cited in note 23).
28. E.S. Scott, N.D. Reppucci, and J.L. Woolard, Evaluating Adolescent Decision Mak-
ing in Legal Contexts, 19 L & Human Beh 221, 224 (1995).
29. See Roth, Meisel, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 279 (cited in note 23).
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decision is irrelevant, and personal autonomy is respected. Weithorn reports that
children as young as age nine possess the necessary skills to manifest some
preference, at least in hypothetical treatment dilemmas.3" Freedman and others
suggest that this test fails to address seriously the question of competence to
consent.31
The test of "reasonable outcome of choice" deems competent an individual
whose decision is compatible with what a "reasonable" person would choose or
with the prevailing medical opinion, regardless of the decision-making process.
While social goals and individual health are promoted, this test may show "utter
disregard of the value of freedom. ' 32 Additionally, the potential exists for
disagreement among health care professionals as to the optimal or most appro-
priate treatment.3 Developmental changes in attitudes toward medical person-
nel and compliance with their preferences may interfere with a minors' ability to
make a voluntary decision. 4
In contrast with the "reasonable outcome of choice" test, the "rational
reasons" standard concentrates on the rational and logical problem-solving
process used to make a determination, without concern for the outcome. Where
the patient has received all pertinent information necessary for a "knowledge-
able" decision, the competent individual would consider all relevant factors,
weighing them as he or she sees fit.3' The rational reasons test relies greatly on
assumptions about the individual's level of cognitive functioning; difficulties may
occur in distinguishing rational from irrational reasons and in drawing inferences
of causality between reasoning and the decision outcome. In the case of both the
reasonable outcome and the rational reasons standards, the patient's competence
will rarely be at issue if the individual consents to the prescribed treatment.36
The fourth and fifth tests attempt to assess the individual's "ability to
understand" and "actual understanding." Evaluation of the ability to understand
is based solely on the patient's ability to comprehend the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to treatment; the reasoning process and the ultimate decision are not
considered. Roth, Meisel, and Lidz suggest that this test is the most consistent
with the legal doctrine of informed consent.3 7 Weithorn notes that factual and
inferential understanding may require different levels of abstraction in thought
and that developmental changes and personal experiences may facilitate or
hinder comprehension.3 ' The standard of actual understanding requires the
patient to give knowledgeable consent after the treatment provider has communi-
30. Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs at 90 (cited in note 1).
31. Freedman, 4 Intl J L & Psychiatry at 62 (cited in note 25).
32. Id at 61. Compare Roth, Meisel, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 279 (cited in note
23).
33. Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs at 91 (cited in note 1).
34. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14).
35. Id; Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs at 93 (cited in note 1).
36. Roth, Meisel, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 279 (cited in note 23).
37. Id.
38. Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs at 94 (cited in note 1).
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cated all options and assessed the patient's understanding of the information.
This stringent test imposes responsibility on the medical professional and
encourages active participation in the patient's decision-making.39 The means by
which the professional is to assess understanding remain vague, but actual under-
standing is the most straightforward and frequently used standard.
RESEARCH ON ELEMENTS OF INFORMED CONSENT
The first element of informed consent to treatment is voluntariness.4" Grisso
and Vierling emphasize that treatment consent is a social act and that individuals
vary in the manner in which they respond to authority figures.4' The require-
ment of voluntariness, however, is often neglected as an element of informed
consent and as a psychological construct, due to the ambiguity of the term.42 It
is not clear to what extent the social influences of coercion, persuasion, and
manipulation or the role-identity constraints imposed by cultural contexts may
influence the decision-making of minors.4" Research addressing the developmen-
tal aspects of several related psychological constructs has been used to assess
minors' capacities to give voluntary consent. Psychodynamic and systems theory
approaches, for example, have been used to explain the emergence of autonomy
and the balance of peer and parent influences on decision-making in adoles-
cence.44 The inverse relationship between age and conformity has been demon-
strated in a number of settings, and most studies have found that acceptance of
social norms peaks in early adolescence and declines as minors approach adult-
hood.4" Similarly, trends toward decreased compliance or obedience and in-
creased opposition or reactance to authority in adolescence appear in the psycho-
logical literature.46 Scherer studied the requirement of voluntariness more
directly by comparing children, adolescents, and young adults on their responses
to three medical treatment vignettes.47 Most respondents deferred to parental
authority in two of the dilemmas. In the more serious kidney donation vignette,
group differences emerged; Scherer found that children were significantly more
likely to comply with parental wishes than were adolescents or young adults.
39. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309(cited in note 14).
40. Meisel, Roth, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 285 (cited in note 24).
41. Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 421 (cited in note 2).
42. D.G. Scherer and N.D. Reppucci, Adolescents' Capacities to Provide Voluntary
Informed Consent, 12 L & Human Beh 123 (1988).
43. D.G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treat-
ment Decisions, 15 L & Human Beh 431, 433 (1991).
44. Id.
45. Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 421 (cited in note 2).
46. See Scherer and Reppucci, 12 L & Human Beh 123 (cited in note 42). The
developmental changes associated with conformity, compliance, and the roles of authority
figures will be discussed more completely below, in considering the various developmental
influences on adolescents' judgments in medical contexts.
47. See Scherer, 15 L & Human Beh 431 (cited in note 43).
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Knowing consent to treatment may be given by an individual who under-
stands the terminology and content of the information provided by the health
care professional, as well as the legal concepts relevant to the medical decision.
Grisso and Vierling operationalize knowing consent as the match between the
information given by the professional and the patient's own description of the
consensual terms and concepts that relate to the decision. 8 Little systematic
research has been conducted to determine the level of understanding of consensu-
al terms for patients of any age confronting a medical treatment decision.49
Tymchuk reports that several studies have shown that adults are frequently not
completely informed under current procedures;s" further difficulties in obtaining
knowing consent from minors may be presented by the health care provider's use
of complicated language. In order to compare how minors and adults understand
medical conditions and treatment options, Weithorn and Campbell tested four
groups of individuals (ages nine, 14, 18, and 21) on four hypothetical treatment
dilemmas."1 The researchers found that the adolescent group demonstrated a
level of factual understanding of the dilemmas that was equivalent to that of the
two groups of young adults; the younger minors appeared less competent in their
understanding of the information provided. 2 Lewis found adolescent and young
adult women awaiting the results of a pregnancy test to be equally knowledge-
able of the legal options relevant to the medical decisions they might face."3 In
another legal realm, however, only 28 percent of the juveniles in a court deten-
tion setting understood the concept that their rights were protected entitlements;
Grisso and Vierling suggest that the understanding of legal terms may follow a
predictable developmental pathway.s4 There remains a need for research on
adolescents' understanding of treatment decision and legal terminology and for
guidelines to aid professionals in providing clear and understandable treatment
information.
The final element of an informed consent requires the individual to make the
decision rationally and intelligently.'5 Whereas cognitive ability might have
some influence on an individual's understanding of consent procedures, it is the
cognitive processes involved in decision-making that are the focus of intelligent
consent."s Some researchers have cited Piaget's research that children typically
attain formal operational thought, the highest stage of cognitive development,
between the ages of 11 and 14." Individuals at the abstract stage of formal
48. Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 416 (cited in note 2).
49. Id at 417.
50. AJ. Tymchuk, Assent Processes, in B. Stanley & J.E. Sieber, eds, Social Research
on Children and Adolescents: Ethical Issues 128 (Sage 1992).
51. L.A. Weithorn and S.B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents
to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 Child Development 1589 (1982).
52. Id at 1595.
53. C.C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50 Am J
Orthopsychiatry 446, 447 (1980).
54. Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 417 (cited in note 2).
55. Meisel, Roth, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 285 (cited in note 24).
56. Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 418 (cited in note 2).
57. See Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 224-25 (cited in note
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operations are capable of using inductive or deductive reasoning to make choices
after considering the potential risks or consequences of alternative options. 8
Because competent medical decision-making requires such abstract thinking
processes, advocates have argued that minors at the level of formal operations
possess the capacity to give intelligent consent. 9 For example, Weithorn and
Campbell found adolescents and young adults to be similar in their inferential
and reasoning processes in three of four treatment dilemmas; competence levels
differed slightly for the epilepsy dilemma.6" Children over the age of 12 also
tend to demonstrate more internal locus of control, which is correlated with
decision-making traits such as the ability to delay one's response, attention to
details, and the gathering of information to assist the reasoning process.6' With
the establishment of concrete operations (prior to the attainment of formal
operations), children become more accurate in their perceptions of care provid-
ers, explanations of illness dimensions, and understanding of disease causality.62
Melton, however, agrees with Grisso and Vierling that children may not be able
to make intelligent consent decisions until they are able to think more abstractly
about the consequences of their choices.63 Grisso and Vierling conclude that, al-
though the age of attainment of formal operations varies (if it occurs at all) and
may differ across intra-individual domains, there "may be no clear rationale for
denying minors over 12 (as a group) the privilege of independent consent...
solely on the basis of intellectual ability."64
ADDITIONAL INFORMED CONSENT CONSIDERATIONS
Under the current informed consent system, there are several exceptions that
allow minors the right to seek medical treatment. The "mature minor" clauses
that invest adolescents with rights based upon the various tests of competence
vary from state to state.6" However, a review of the literature reveals that the
mature minor provisions are insufficiently quantified or qualified.66 Other
exceptions appear on the surface to be more well-defined. For example, most
states allow minors to seek treatment independently for conditions that could
28).
58. B. Inhelder and J. Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to
Adolescence (Basic 1958).
59. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 225 (cited in note 28).
60. Weithorn and Campbell, 53 Child Development at 1596 (cited in note 51).
61. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14).
62. G.B. Melton, Children's Participation in Treatment Planning: Psychological and
Legal Issues, 12 Professional Psychology 246 (1981); C. Sigelman, et al, Age Differences
in Understandings of Disease Causality: AIDS, Colds, and Cancer, 64 Child Development
272, 282 (1993).
63. See Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology at 419 (cited in note 2).
64. Id at 420-21.
65. See Roth, Meisel, and Lidz, 134 Am J Psychiatry 279 (cited in note 23). See also
Weithorn, 5 Child & Youth Servs 85 (cited in note 1).
66. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14), and Grisso
& Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology 412 (cited in note 2).
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endanger the public health (e.g., venereal diseases), and a number of states allow
access to treatment for conditions that invoke privacy issues (e.g., reproductive
rights, chemical dependency, and mental health care). In these areas, despite
better legal definitions, the same problems with tests of competence may arise in
various circumstances.67
"Emancipated minors," those adolescents who are either married, enlisted in
the armed services, or otherwise economically independent of their parents,
represent another exception under the current informed consent system.68
Wadlington notes, however, that emancipation can be "a precarious venture" in
instances when it is unclear why the minor has left home or sought independence
from the parents. 69 He also points out that few statutes address the respective
liabilities of parents and their children who are either emancipated or declared
competent for the purposes of a specific treatment decision.71 It is unclear
whether the consent of a competent minor, in addition to or in lieu of the
consent of his or her parents, must be obtained in all treatment decisions.
Whereas emancipated minors should be financially liable for their own decisions,
parents are often held liable for the costs of all necessary treatments for their
unemancipated children, even if the treatment is ordered over their objections.
Holder writes that such questions of consent are frequently analyzed as economic
decisions rather than as theoretical ramifications of the adolescent's autonomous
rights.
Gardner, Scherer, and Tester state that there are at least three possible
research strategies for assessing the competence of adolescents in a medical
treatment context.72 One strategy would determine whether a minor possessed
an operationally defined minimum level of competence. Courts and legisla-
tures, however, have not provided definitions of minimum legal standards for
competent legal decision-making.4 Another strategy would compare the minor's
decision-making with a hypothetical standard of optimal rationality. Under this
standard, even most adults would be considered incompetent.7' The third
strategy is the one that has necessarily been adopted: minors' decision-making
skills are compared with those of adults, who are presumed by law to be
67. See Melton, 12 Professional Psychology 246 (cited in note 62)
68. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14).
69. W. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors: The Legal Framework, in
G.B. Melton, G.P. Koocher, and M.J. Saks, eds, Children's Competence to Consent 121
(Plenum 1983).
70. Id.
71. A.R. Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine (Yale 2d ed
1985).
72. W. Gardner, D. Scherer, and M. Tester, Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive
Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am Psychologist 895, 897 (1989).
73. Id.
74. J. Gittler, M. Quigley-Rick, and MJ. Saks, Adolescent Health Care Decision Mak-
ing: The Law and Public Policy (Carnegie Corp 1990).
75. Id; P.S. Appelbaum and T. Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 New Eng J Medicine 1635, 1637 (1988).
1998]
46 Roundtable
competent. Gardner, Scherer, and Tester criticized some advocates who have
"overstated" the current knowledge about decision-making by claiming that
there are no differences between the capacities of adults and adolescents.76 They
argue that competence cannot be generalized across settings and that the few
existing studies comparing decision-making by adolescents and adults utilized
small sample sizes or contexts of questionable ecological validity.77 King, on the
other hand, believes the research to be conclusive enough to recommend lower-
ing the age of majority to 12 or 13 for purposes of health care decisions.78
Billick agrees with King that a case-by-case assessment of competence is inconsis-
tent with privacy rights and that minors should not be evaluated against higher
cognitive standards than those used for adults." Setting the age of majority at
14, according to Billick, would provide a margin of several years beyond the
expectancy of moral and cognitive development.8" Other researchers suggest
using sliding scales of competence (varying the applicable concepts or the
required level of performance by age), based on evaluations of risk-gain ratios.8'
Overall, the findings of informed consent researchers have been quite
consistent. Minors, and especially adolescents, are more similar to adults than
the law assumes, in both the choices they make and in the logical processes they
follow. This is not to say that the results of all of these investigations have been
entirely consistent; but by and large, minors aged 14 years and higher make
decisions regarding waiver of rights or consent to medical procedures in generally
the same manner that adults do. In some situations, children as young as nine
years choose outcomes congruent with those chosen by adults,82 but the pro-
cesses and reasoning behind these decisions are different.83 Analyses of social
costs, however, may emphasize the need to consider judgment factors (e.g.,
consideration of social consequences) as well as cognitive and reasoning ability
in determining adolescents' legal capacities.
Evaluating Judgment Factors
Legal presumptions that adolescents are incompetent to make medical
treatment decisions have not been based solely on ideas about minors' deficits in
understanding and reasoning. Paternalistic legal policies have also been guided by
76. Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, 44 Am Psychologist at 897 (cited in note 72).
77. Id at 898-99.
78. P.A. King, Treatment and Minors: Issues Not Involving Lifesaving Treatment, 23
J Family L 241 (1985).
79. S.B. Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 Bull Am Academy Psychiatry & L 301
(1986).
80. Id.
81. Appelbaum and Grisso, 319 New Eng J Medicine at 1638 (cited in note 75). See
also Gaylin, Annual Prog in Child Psychiatry & Child Development 507 (cited in note
16).
82. Weithorn and Campbell, 53 Child Development at 1596 (cited in note 51).
83. See Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology 412 (cited in note 2). See also
Melton, 12 Professional Psychology 246 (cited in note 62).
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the assumption that minors have less mature judgment. 4 Whereas the law
emphasizes protection from harm, health care professionals often seek to
maximize the effectiveness of the treatment by balancing its benefits against its
risks (such as cost, side effects, or failure rates). As a result, medical professionals
have been more concerned with a patient's ability to weigh costs and benefits in
a social context than with legal tests of cognitive abilities."5 Scott, Reppucci,
and Woolard give two reasons why judgment should be considered through
outcome-based measures of competence in assessing adolescent qualitative
decision-making. 6 The first reason is the policy that the importance of respect-
ing autonomy does not outweigh the social cost of "poor" treatment decisions
made by minors, who are presumed to have poorer judgment than adults. The
second reason is the assumption that poor decisions made by adolescents are
influenced by developmental factors that will change with maturity. Thompson
writes that the recognition of minors' limitations has led to an "interesting
combination of limited prerogatives and beneficent paternalism,'" and advocates
a new developmental formulation for research with minors that includes develop-
mental factors in risk-benefit analyses.8 7 Thus far, the assumptions of develop-
mental influences on the quality of adolescent judgment have been based more
on intuition than on research.8 This section will review research on conformity
and compliance and on risk-taking and temporal perspective, developmental
factors often hypothesized to affect decision-making.
CONFORMITY AND TREATMENT COMPLIANCE
High rates of conforming behavior found in early adolescence have led some
researchers to question the possibility of voluntary consent before the age of
15." Later in adolescence, on the other hand, minors' judgment skills have been
questioned as a result of their being stereotyped as more noncompliant, more
deferent to peers, and less obedient to adults.90 Berndt found that peer confor-
mity for prosocial and antisocial behaviors in hypothetical situations peaked in
sixth or ninth grade whereas conformity to parents decreased steadily from third
84. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 227 (cited in note 28).
85. T.G. Gutheil, et al, Participation in Competency Assessment and Treatment Deci-
sions: The Role of a Psychiatrist-Attorney Team, 11 Mental & Physical Disability Rptr
446.
86. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 228 (cited in note 28).
87. R.A. Thompson, Developmental Changes in Research Risk and Benefit: A Changing
Calculus of Concerns, in B. Stanley & J.E. Sieber, eds, Social Research on Children and
Adolescents: Ethical Issues 31, 38 (Sage 1992).
88. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 228 (cited in note 28).
89. See Grisso and Vierling, 9 Professional Psychology 412 (cited in note 2). See also
Scherer, 15 L & Human Beh 431 (cited in note 43).
90. T.J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 Devel-
opmental Psychology 608 (1979); R.N. Jamison, S. Lewis, and T.G. Burish, Cooperation
with Treatment in Adolescent Cancer Patients, 7 J Adolescent Health 162 (1986).
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to twelfth grade.91 Landsbaum and Willis report that young adolescents showed
more conforming behavior than did young adults in an experiment on partner
influences; both groups, however, showed greater conformity when they believed
that their partner was an expert or a highly competent individual.92 Deference
to "experts" may leave minors vulnerable in dealing with medical professionals,
especially due to the stress of the situation and to the potential conflict in the
parent-adolescent relationship that can result from greater financial depen-
dence.93 Steinfeld hypothesizes that peer conformity resulting from social com-
parison may have its greatest influence on compliance with treatment regimens
and that it may be particularly difficult for adolescents to follow through on
treatments if the procedure makes the individual feel different from his or her
peers.94 Silber speculates that concerns over body image, in particular, may
leave adolescents (even more than adults) feeling self-conscious, inadequate, and
vulnerable to the judgment of others."' For example, the wearing of a brace or
the loss of hair from radiation treatments may result in negative feedback from
adolescent peers. This feedback could lead to problems with identity achievement
and manifest itself in depression, poor peer relations, or low self-esteem.96
The few studies that have examined treatment compliance in adolescents,
however, have not conclusively identified factors associated with noncooperation
across all groups.97 Cromer and Tarnowski, in a review of the literature, suggest
that adolescent compliance rates are generally lower than those for young
children. Compliance rates vary greatly according to the specific disease or
disorder, its treatment regimen, demographic variables of the study population,
and the manner in which compliance is operationalized and measured. 8 System-
atic comparisons of long-term treatment compliance in adolescents and adults
have not been reported.
RISK-TAKING AND TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE
Adolescents and young adults appear to take more risks than do older
adults.99 The prevalence of high-risk behaviors among teenagers has led to
disproportionately high rates of negative outcomes such as sexually transmitted
91. See Berndt, 15 Developmental Psychology 608 (cited in note 90).
92. J.B. Landsbaum and R.H. Willis, Conformity in Early and Late Adolescence, 4
Developmental Psychology 334, 335-36 (1971).
93. See Scherer and Reppucci, 12 L & Human Beh 123 (cited in note 42); B.I.
Steinfeld, Adolescent Development and Psychopathology, in E.L. Feindler and G.R. Kalfus,
eds, Adolescent Behavior Therapy Handbook 107, 117 (Springer 1990).
94. Steinfeld, Adolescent Development and Psychopathology (cited in note 93).
95. T.J. Silber, Approaching the Adolescent Patient: Pitfalls and Solutions, 7 J Ado-
lescent Health Care 31S, 38S (1986).
96. Steinfeld, Adolescent Development and Psychopathology at 117 (cited in note 93).
97. Jamison, Lewis, and Burish, 7 J Adolescent Health at 162 (cited in note 90).
98. B.A. Cromer and K.J. Tarnowski, Noncompliance in Adolescents: A Review, 10
Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics 207 (1989).
99. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 230 (cited in note 28).
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diseases and traffic accidents."' Knowledge regarding such voluntary risk-
taking behaviors among adolescents is vital because of the strong contribution of
these behaviors to mortality rates and social dysfunction.0 1 In order to deter-
mine whether adolescents misunderstand the risks they take or whether instead
they choose to ignore attendant risk, Quadrel, Fischhoff, and Davis compared
risk probability estimates of middle-class adults, their teenage children, and high-
risk adolescents sampled from treatment homes." The authors found evidence
of perceived invulnerability in all three groups; however, this perception was no
greater for adolescents than for adults. Gardner, Herman, and Wilfong asked
children, young adolescents, and young adults to make paired-comparison
choices between risky alternatives. In their study, the child and adolescent groups
consistently disregarded at least one informational dimension in their decision-
making relative to the adult, group." In a simulated peer-counseling situation,
Lewis found that older adolescents mentioned more potential risks to consider in
a medical treatment decision than did younger adolescents.0 4 The students in
grade 12 were also more likely to mention future consequences of the medical
decision than were the younger subjects in the sample.05
Temporal perspective becomes an important decision-making element when
the short-term and long-term consequences of a choice must be considered."'6
A variety of researchers have speculated that adolescent tendencies to emphasize
the present over the future may represent an uncertainty about the future, a lack
of experience, or a failure to foresee the consequences. 07 Again, comparisons
of how adolescents and young adults consider risks and future orientation in
valid treatment settings are needed to better understand the developmental
impact of these factors on judgment and decision-making.
Future Research Considerations
Medical decision-making studies are often replete with threats to external
validity, which may limit the extent to which generalizations can be made from
their samples to other populations.0 8 There remains a need to investigate the
100. R.L. North, Legal Authority for HIV Testing of Adolescents, 11 J Adolescent
Health Care 176, 176-77 (1990); M.J. Quadrel, B. Fischhoff, and W. Davis, Adolescent
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Making (U Pittsburgh, unpublished manuscript 1991).
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construct of competence as a product of an individual's capacities, the specific
task required of the individual, and the situational and social influences sur-
rounding the task. By studying adolescents and adults who are facing the stress
and consequences of real treatment decisions, determinations of competence and
the influence of judgment factors can be based on data from more valid samples.
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY
In order to ascertain conclusively which (if any) developmental factors
influence decision-making ability in adolescents and adults, it is important to
study individuals in ecologically valid contexts. Given the current notions of
variable competence, it is unrealistic to assume that results from general descrip-
tions of cognition or from specific conditions within different contexts will apply
to an individual who is actually confronted with a medical dilemma.0 9 The
stress of a real treatment situation or chronic illness may interfere with one's
cognitive performance on tests of competence." ° Long-term stress resulting
from a family member's chronic illness may also have a disorganizing effect on
an adolescent's illness concepts."' Garrison and McQuiston report that some
chronically ill adolescent patients exhibit lower levels of perceived health control
than healthy adolescents, and locus of control has been hypothesized to relate to
treatment compliance."' Patients' decision-making could additionally be affect-
ed (positively or negatively) by the complexity or salience of a real decision as
opposed to a hypothetical dilemma. 3
There must be an iterative cycle of discovery between laboratory and field-
based methods." 4 The use of field research designs would also allow for exami-
nation of decision-making in which minors would be making decisions about
their own, rather than a hypothetical, treatment or involvement. This latter
variation could have particular significance for how the problem of consent is
framed by a minor."' The use of medical patients as subjects would allow
researchers to evaluate decision-making differences among groups in more valid
contexts.
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SAMPLE DIVERSITY
Samples should reflect, across age groups, a variety of demographic vari-
ables, including gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, emancipated versus
dependent status, and intelligence."' In order to describe the developmental
changes in the decision processes of adolescents and adults, the sample must con-
sist of individuals covering the entire span of the age ranges.'17 Gittler,
Quigley-Rick, and Saks recommend that within-group as well as between-group
variability should be reported because wide variation within age groups may be
just as important as the presence or absence of group differences.'
PATIENT INVOLVEMENT
In addition to comparing patients with nonpatients, studies of decision-
making processes and outcomes should consider the impact of the patients'
involvement in the treatment decision and implementation. Weinberger maintains
that adolescent participation in decision-making is essential for active coopera-
tion and success in any medical regimen. The author also points out that compli-
ance is most likely when the adolescent perceives a possibility of a normal
lifestyle." Cavanaugh reports high compliance rates in adolescent girls whose
conditions were monitored via telephone appointments made by the patients.
This type of follow-up involves the patient in the regimen, with little interference
in the daily routine.20 Melton notes that children given free access to a school
nurse in a demonstration project showed decreased levels of perceived vulnerabil-
ity, increased belief in the value of self-care, and no behavioral changes in the
utilization of services."' However, others have suggested that patient involve-
ment at an early age may add unnecessary stress to the treatment dilemma."
Overall, it appears as though adolescent patients who are involved in their
treatment decisions may differ from those who are not, in terms of recovery
time, compliance with professionals' recommendations, and perceptions of
treatment efficacy.12
Adolescent involvement in their own medical decisions could be beneficial
because of a resultant increased sense of control and mastery.2 An equally
compelling argument could be made, however, that such involvement might have
detrimental effects, such as guilt and isolation, if certain assumed outcomes do
116. See King, 23 J Family L 241 (cited in note 78).
117. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 239 (cited in note 28).
118. Gittler, Quigley-Rick, and Saks, Adolescent Health Care Decision Making (cited in
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119. See Weinberger, 8 J Adolescent Health Care 74 (cited in note 107).
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Clinical Pediatrics 302 (1990).
121. See Melton, 12 Professional Psychology 246 (cited in note 62).
122. Koocher, Children Under Law (cited in note 106).
123. See Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14).
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not materialize. Given the lack of empirical information regarding the effects of
involving children in decision-making, this issue is largely left as a conflict of
values. 12' That is, consideration regarding the involvement of children in deci-
sion-making currently revolves around the values attached to increasing the sense
of control in children and to the roles and responsibilities of parents in bearing
the brunt of responsibility for decisions affecting the family. Action research (i.e.,
empirical work assessing real world interventions) that describes the impact of
involving minors in decision-making could help focus this debate. 6
INTERPERSONAL NATURE OF DECISIONS
Scherer and Reppucci point out that treatment decisions are made in a social
context and that voluntariness is the result of the interaction between person and
environment. 127 In fact, all aspects of the decision-making process should be
viewed in a social context. Silber writes that failure to obtain an adolescent's
compliance with a treatment regimen is frequently caused by a lack of knowledge
regarding the doctor-patient relationship. 128 Research has suggested a link be-
tween the continuity of the physician-patient relationship and increased patient
satisfaction and treatment compliance. Given the interpersonal nature of the
medical decision-making process, Tepper and Elwork suggest that research on
decision-making competence ought to more accurately represent the relevant
situational factors.'29 Research involving actual treatment dilemmas could
address the patient's perceptions of other individuals' roles and feelings and the
extent to which the reactions of others influence the patient's choice. By consid-
ering the entire social context of the treatment dilemma from a dynamical family
systems perspective, much more could be learned about the influences of confor-
mity, social referencing, small-group dynamics, and other social interactions on
the decision-making processes employed by both adolescent and adult patients.
FAMILY FUNCTIONING
The assumption that the family functions to protect a minor's best interest
has grown out of the common law tradition in which families were held liable
for the proper upbringing of their children. 3 ° Since the late 1960s, however,
the expansion of both case law and public awareness regarding child abuse and
neglect, the increased concern over the problem of status offenders, and a
zeitgeist of proactive family policy have all forced a rethinking of how to
characterize the family's interest for certain legal purposes. 3' Social scientists
125. Compare Carter and St. Lawrence, 3 Beh Sci & L 309 (cited in note 14).
126. Mulvey and Britner, Law and Mental Health Issues at 331 (cited in note 7).
127. See Scherer and Reppucci, 12 L & Human Beh 123 (cited in note 42).
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have thus far been rather ineffective in providing information that could be very
helpful in this reformulation. Despite the crucial role in this area of many
assumptions regarding family functioning, very little empirical evidence addresses
these issues. Although long active in promoting broad family policy proposals,
social scientists have done relatively few studies regarding the various legal
assumptions concerning family life.13 1 Much more research must address the
role of coercion, manipulation, persuasion, and deference to authority within
families before minors' voluntary decision-making can be understood."' Ad-
vances in dynamic modeling methods for family systems, along with recent work
regarding the dimensions of family functioning related to particular medical and
mental health problems, could provide the tools necessary for measuring certain
variables that often carry legal ramifications (e.g., increased family strife, altered
family communication patterns, etc.).13 1 Using structured measures and se-
quential modeling techniques, laboratory studies of family decision-making
regarding legal issues could be coordinated with focused field studies or evalu-
ations of natural experiments (e.g., changes in criteria for court referrals).,l5
THE USE OF PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION
Research should also focus on the accuracy of assumptions underlying
juvenile and family law and on the discretion granted to professionals working
in this system. Efforts to operationalize individualized justice have necessarily
produced a widely varying system with a heavy emphasis on case-focused
discretion."6 A reliance on the value of social scientific reasoning and profes-
sional opinion can be seen in most procedures. Research on decision-maker at-
tributes, though, has produced no clear support for the influence of experience
(and only limited support for the influence of training) on the validity of clinical
judgments or on thd relative effects of other contextual factors.'
Given what is known about decision-making in general and more specifically
about decisions concerning childhood and adolescent problems, researchers must
think of decisions in these systems as being very contextually based judgments
made under conditions of uncertainty." Future research must focus on the
process by which contextual factors influence the way clinicians frame a case,
rather than on how certain factors are consistently relied upon across cases. The
132. See, for example, J. Knitzer, Mental Health Services to Children and Adolescents:
A National View of Public Policies, 39 Am Psychologist 905 (1984).
133. Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 230 (cited in note 28).
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presently dominant model, however, posits that professionals make "optimizing"
decisions in which the best solution to the presenting problem is assessed rather
independently of the service setting. Researchers would do better to adopt a
model in which the solution is found that balances competing imposed interests.
One particular problem with most social science research in this area is that
investigators rarely involve professionals and other service providers when
planning their research. Consequently, the researcher's categories and concep-
tions often fail to match those used by actual decision-makers."' Research that
seeks and incorporates the input of service-providers and decision-makers has
been done regarding juvenile justice decisions, and the body of legally relevant
social science work specific to abortion decision-making is growing. 4 ' Before
reviewing that research, we first present a brief outline of past adolescent
abortion cases.
Adolescent Abortion Cases
The question of adolescent competence to make medical decisions is particu-
larly relevant to the issue of abortion given the prevalence of teen sexuality,
pregnancy, and abortion.'4' Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v
Danforth extended the legal right to abortion to minors in 1976, yet it also
asserted that not all minors are competent to consent to abortion.'42 Third
parties (i.e., parents or judges) may thus have the right to make decisions on
behalf of incompetent or immature minors.'43 Currently, most states do require
third-party involvement in adolescents' abortion decisions, either through
parental consent or notification or through a judicial bypass alternative. '"
Several important Supreme Court decisions established precedent for current
laws regarding adolescent abortion. Griswold v Connecticut, decided in 1965,
was the first case to discuss issues of adults' contraceptive rights.'45 The
Griswold Court, interpreting the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
held that an adult's rights to privacy extended to a right to contraceptive
privacy."' In 1973, Roe v Wade extended adult privacy rights from the right
to prevent pregnancy (as in Griswold) to the right to terminate unplanned or
unwanted pregnancies, at least during the first and second trimesters.'47
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Until 1976, only the contraception and abortion rights of adults had been
addressed by the Court. The issue of adolescent abortion first entered the legal
and psychological arenas with Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v
Danforth. 4' In Danforth, the Court was presented with a Missouri statute
requiring unmarried minors who were pregnant to obtain parental consent before
obtaining abortions. In striking down the statute, the Court held that states
could not impose "blanket provisions" requiring parental consent. 49 While the
Danforth decision to allow minors privacy in abortion matters became the
foundational precedent for minors' abortion rights, the Court recognized that
these rights are not absolute."' 0 Although the Danforth decision upheld the
right of minors to have an abortion, it also held that not all minors are compe-
tent to consent to abortion."' Thus, a legal distinction between "competent"
and "incompetent" minors' rights arose.
After Danforth, the Court consistently upheld laws requiring parental
consent or notification, so long as the laws also provided opportunity for judicial
review." For example, in Bellotti v Baird, a Massachusetts statute requiring the
consent of both parents was ruled constitutional, because a judicial bypass alter-
native was also offered."'3 The judicial bypass option gives the minor the legal
right to obtain an abortion without parental consultation if a court concludes
that the adolescent is competent to make her decision independently. Bellotti
noted differences in the rights of "mature" and "immature" minors but neglected
to provide legal guidelines or definitions for the distinction. 4
The subject of the mature minor was addressed again in H.L. v Matheson,
where the Court upheld a Utah law requiring physicians to notify parents in an
effort to promote family communication." An additional limit to minors'
rights was provided in Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri v Ashcroft,
in which the Court held that a minor deemed "immature" must demonstrate that
abortion is in her best interest before the procedure is performed."' Under
these decisions, a mature minor is expected to demonstrate sufficient "emotional
development, maturity, intellect and understanding" to provide informed consent
to abortion procedures. 7 Together, these decisions (along with Hodgson v
Minnesota and Ohio v Akron Center for Reproductive Health) form the legal
framework for current adolescent abortion laws." 8 Planned Parenthood of
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey reaffirmed that parental consent or notifica-
tion laws will typically be upheld if there is a judicial bypass alternative and if
the laws do not place "undue stress" on the adolescent seeking abortion."9
Adolescents' rights to abortion have been restricted by the Supreme Court
based on three assumptions: first, that minors are less competent decision-makers
than adults; second, that minors are generally less "mature" than adults; and
third, that adolescents' best interests will be represented by third-party decision-
makers, typically parents or judges. 6 ' However, social science research has not
been utilized by legislatures or the Court in restricting minors' access to abortion
in the years since Danforth.' In fact, psychological research concludes that the
assumptions upon which these restrictions are based are largely unsubstanti-
ated. 6 ' In the next section, the research evidence specific to adolescent abor-
tion decision-making is reviewed.
Adolescent Abortion
A growing body of psychological research has been devoted to examining the
existing legal framework for adolescent abortion. Such research usually focuses
on critiquing the rationale behind such laws. The research specific to adolescent
competence in the context of abortion decisions typically suffers from some of
the same methodological troubles described earlier with regard to more general
research concerning informed consent and medical decision-making. However,
the research reviewed below does include excellent examples of social scientific
inquiry into legally relevant and ecologically valid contexts that can genuinely
inform legal policy regarding adolescent capacity in high stakes, real-world
contexts.
ADOLESCENT DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH
Commentators have often criticized research regarding medical decision-
making for its frequent use of hypothetical vignette studies conducted in labora-
tories or university classrooms with subjects who are predominantly white and
middle-class.' 63 Responding to such criticisms, several studies have focused on
Reproductive Health, 497 US 502 (1990).
159. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 112 S Ct 2791 (1992).
160. N.D. Reppucci and C.A. Crosby, Law, Psychology, and Children: Overarching Is-
sues, 17 L & Human Beh 1 (1993); Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh
at 221 (cited in note 28).
161. Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion (ICAA), Adolescent Abortion:
Psychological and Legal Issues, 42 Am Psychologist 73; G. B. Melton and N. F. Russo,
Adolescent Abortion: Psychological Perspectives on Public Policy, 42 Am Psychologist 69,
70 (1987).
162. See Ambuel and Rappaport, 16 L & Human Beh 129 (cited in note 109); ICAA,
42 Am Psychologist at 73-74 (cited in note 161); Lewis, 50 Am J Orthopsychiatry 446
(cited in note 53); Melton and Russo, 42 Am Psychologist at 70 (cited in note 161). See
also K.A. Moore, C.W. Nord, and J.C. Peterson, Nonvoluntary Sexual Activity Among
Adolescents, 21 Family Planning Perspectives 110 (1989).
163. See, for example, E.P. Mulvey and F.L. Peeples, Are Disturbed and Normal Adoles-
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adults and adolescents making actual abortion decisions. For example, Lewis
questioned 16 minors and 26 adults about their pregnancy decisions and found
that minors (age 17 and younger) did not differ from adults (age 18 and older)
in the number of people they consulted about their decisions or in the type of
people they consulted (typically including parents, boyfriends, and physi-
cians).164 Adolescents were more likely than adults to see their decisions as
externally compelled, but they equalled adults in the cognitive competence of
their decision-making.16 Adolescents were found to use the same decision-
making strategies and possess the same capacity as adults to reason abstractly
and hypothetically.' 6 Although limited by its small sample size, this study laid
the framework for more extensive research regarding ecologically valid adoles-
cent abortion choices.
Another study that examined actual decision-making in adolescent abortion
cases was conducted by Ambuel and Rappaport. 6 7 This study examined three
age groups in an attempt to examine developmental trends in decisiofi-making.
The researchers tested 75 women, aged 13-21 years, who were seeking pregnancy
tests at a women's clinic and found that girls in both adolescent age groups (aged
15 or younger and aged 16 to 17) who considered abortion were just as compe-
tent cognitively as women in the adult age group (aged 18 to 21). They also
found that adolescents under age 15 who did not consider abortion were less
competent than adults in their decision-making. 6 ' Foster and Sprinthall inter-
viewed unmarried females who were aborting their first pregnancy in the first
trimester.69 Comparing three age ranges, there were differences in assessments
of moral reasoning and ego development between the young adolescents (aged 12
to 14), the older adolescents (aged 17 to 19) and the young adults (aged 23 to
25). However, there were no differences in the level of reasoning associated with
the abortion decision across the three age groups; all three groups were assessed
to be at the self-protective level characterized by consideration of financial con-
sequences and the need to be self-reliant. 7 '
In these abortion-specific studies of real decision-makers, as in the larger
body of psychological research using both real-life decisions and even hypotheti-
cal vignettes, adolescents aged 14 to 15 and older were equal to adults in their
competency to make informed, voluntary, and intelligent treatment decisions. 7'
cents Equally Competent to Make Decisions About Mental Health Treatments?, 20 L &
Human Beh 273 (1996); Mulvey and Britner, Law and Mental Health Issues at 330 (cited
in note 7); Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard, 19 L & Human Beh at 221 (cited in note 28).
164. Lewis, 50 Am J Orthopsychiatry at 448 (cited in note 53).
165. Id at 452.
166. Ambuel, 4 Current Directions in Psychological Science at 3 (cited in note 156).
167. See Ambuel and Rappaport, 16 L & Human Beh 129 (cited in note 109).
168. Id.
169. V. Foster and N.A. Sprinthall, Developmental Profiles of Adolescents and Young
Adults Choosing Abortion: Stage Sequence, Decalage, and Implications for Policy, 27
Adolescence 655 (1992).
170. Id.
171. See Ambuel and Rappaport, 16 L & Human Beh 129 (cited in note 109); Lewis,
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As research in this area progresses, more sophisticated and validated measures
are needed to evaluate adolescent understanding, appreciation, rational manipu-
lation (or reasoning), and expression of an abortion choice.'
PARENTAL CONSENT RESEARCH AND RESTRICTIONS
Although legal restrictions on minors' reproductive rights have emphasized
the competence of some but not all minors, research has indicated that courts do
not effectively distinguish between "mature" and "immature" minors.' A re-
view of court decisions indicates that nearly all minors who seek judicial review
are considered mature by the courts, and that abortion is almost always deemed
in the best interests of minors who are found to be immature. For example, in
Hodgson v Minnesota, certain testimony stated that 3573 petitions for judicial
bypass were requested during a five-year period and that all but 15 of these
minors were deemed mature by the court.74 Obviously, there is a discrepancy
between the legal framework and the actual decisions made by the courts
regarding adolescent abortion. Some psychological researchers have argued that
courts are unable to differentiate between "mature" and "immature" minors,
such that the legal requirement that adolescents seek third-party consent in
abortion decisions places an undue burden on the constitutional rights of the
adolescents. 7 s
Although all minors are encouraged to consult parents in making abortion
decisions, recent parental consent and notification laws are intended to protect
immature minors from making poor decisions that can put them at physical or
psychological risk; however, these laws themselves are associated with some
serious negative effects.'76 Third-party consent procedures, via either parental
consent or judicial bypass, may result in delayed abortion decision-making.77
As abortion decisions are delayed, the probability of medical and psychological
harm increases.' 78 Such laws may also influence minors to carry their pregnan-
cies to term, which can result in greater psychological and medical harm to the
50 Am J Orthopsychiatry at 452 (cited in note 53); Weithorn and Campbell, 53 Child
Development at 1595 (cited in note 51).
172. See, for example, T. Grisso, et al, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study II:
Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L & Human
Beh 127 (1995), regarding the development of tests measuring competence to consent to
mental health treatment.
173. A. Pliner and S. Yates, Psychological and Legal Issues in Minors' Rights to
Abortion, 48 J Social Issues 203 (1992).
174. Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 US 417 (1990). See Pliner and Yates, 48 J Social Issues
203 (cited in note 173).
175. ICAA, Adolescent Abortion at 75 (cited in note 161).
176. See Pliner and Yates, 48 J Social Issues 203 (cited in note 173).
177. Id; W. Cates Jr., Abortion for Teenagers, in J.E. Hodgson, ed, Abortion and
Sterilization: Medical and Social Aspects 139 (Academic 1981).
178. G.B. Melton and A.J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in G.B.
Melton, ed, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological & Legal Issues 1 (Nebraska 1986).
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adolescent than abortion. 79 Cates, for instance, found that the mortality rate
for adolescent pregnancy continuation was five times higher than the mortality
rate for adolescent abortion.' It should be noted that first trimester abortion
is not associated with significant trauma or psychological morbidity for women,
including adolescents."'1 In a diverse sample of 1189 black and 3147 white
women, abortion choice had no independent relationship to measures of
women's well-being, when well-being before becoming pregnant was statistically
controlled."' 2 This finding held across race and religion.8 3
Some support has also been found for the idea that psychological harm may
be induced by intrusions into the privacy of adolescents making abortion
decisions."8 4 The rationale behind such findings is based on the notion of
learned helplessness; that is, if adolescents learn that they do not have ultimate
control over their bodies and their reproductive decisions, they will be more
likely to experience negative psychological consequences, such as depression and
hopelessness. However, empirical research is needed to confirm or refute these
findings.
What effect have parental notification laws had on parental involvement in
minors' abortion choices? Contrary to popular opinion, adolescents have demon-
strated that they are more likely than not to involve parents in abortion decisions
regardless of the legal requirements to do so."8' In a study by Torres, Forrest,
and Eisman, 51 percent of adolescents (including 75 percent of minors age 15
and younger) voluntarily involved parents in their abortion decisions.8 6 Com-
paring 148 minors who were obtaining an abortion in a state with a mandatory
notification law with 37 minors in a state without a notification law, Resnick, et
al, found that all of the teens had consulted at least one individual before
obtaining the abortion.18 7 One-fourth of the minors did not consult an adult,
but they were primarily the oldest minors. At the time of the abortion and at a
follow-up interview one year later, these adolescents most frequently reported
that their mother and their male partner were the two most helpful and im-
179. Id.
180. Cates, Abortion for Teenagers (cited in note 177).
181. N.E. Adler and P. Dolcini, Psychological Issues in Abortion for Adolescents, in
G.B. Melton, ed, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological & Legal Issues 74 (Nebraska 1986);
N.L. Stotland, Conceptions and Misconceptions: Decisions about Pregnancy, 18 Genl
Hospital Psychiatry 238 (1996).
182. N.F. Russo and A.J. Dabul, The Relationship of Abortion to Well-Being: Do Race
and Religion Make a Difference?, 28 Professional Psychology: Research & Practice 23
(1997).
183. Id.
184. Melton and Pliner, Adolescent Abortion at 21-22 (cited in note 178).
185. But see F. Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of Parental Notifi-
cation in a Metropolitan Area, 72 Am J Pub Health 283 (1982).
186. A. Torres, J.D. Forrest, and S. Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and
Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 Family Planning Perspec-
tives 284 (1980).
187. M.D. Resnick, et al, Patterns of Consultation Among Adolescent Minors Obtaining
an Abortion, 64 Am J Orthopsychiatry 310 (1994).
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portant people in influencing their abortion decision. Similarly, younger minors
and minors with low self-perceived competence or high degrees of internal
conflict have been found to frequently involve parents in their abortion decisions,
while the degree of emotional and financial dependence and the quality and
nature of family communication were found to influence teen decisions to
confide in their parents.'88 In short, where parental involvement laws have been
implemented, they have failed to promote family consultation. 89
Whereas the intent of involving parents as mature decision-makers and
supporters of their children is logical, it is important to consider the probable
reaction of the parent to the teen's pregnancy and abortion decision. Following
an abortion, women who perceive high levels of social support from their
partners, families, and friends generally have higher self-efficacy for coping,
which in turn predicts better post-abortion psychological adjustment. 9 ° In a
study by Major et al, women who told close others about the abortion but did
not perceive them to be fully supportive showed inferior psychological adjust-
ment to those women who were supported and to those women who chose not
to tell anyone about their decision.' Research by Moore, Nord, and Peterson
proposes that the assumption that the family will act in the best interest of the
minor is not always correct. Laws requiring parental consent or notification
regarding abortion decisions may actually induce, rather than prevent, psycholog-
ical harm.'92 Moreover, Moore et al, found that by age 14, 70 percent of white
adolescents and 33 percent of black adolescents with sexual experience had
acquired their sexual experience only because it was forced.'93 Especially in
cases of familial sexual abuse, the laws invoked to protect adolescents from their
"poor judgment" are the same laws that may require pregnant teens to seek
consent from abusive parents.
Legal Recommendations
Perhaps due to some or all of the aforementioned problems with mandating
parental consent, a survey of 1000 pediatricians revealed that the majority did
not believe parental permission should be required in issues related to sexuality,
except for abortion requests by younger adolescents (aged 13 to 15 and youn-
188. J.P. Ashton, Patterns of Discussion and Decision-Making Amongst Abortion Pa-
tients, 12 J Biosocial Science 247 (1980); M.S. Griffin-Carlson and K.J. Mackin, Parental
Consent: Factors Influencing Adolescent Disclosure Regarding Abortion, 28 Adolescence 1
(1993); R.H. Rosen, Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-Making: Are Parents Important?, 57
Adolescence 43 (1980).
189. M.C. Crosby and A. English, Mandatory Parental Involvement/Judicial Bypass
Laws: Do They Promote Adolescents' Health?, 12 J Adolescent Health 143 (1991).
190. B. Major, et al, Perceived Social Support, Self-Efficacy, and Adjustment to
Abortion, 59 J Personality & Social Psychology 452 (1990).
191. Id.
192. See Moore, Nord, and Peterson, 21 Family Planning Perspectives 110 (cited in note
162).
193. Id.
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ger). 194 Psychologists, evaluating both the research on adolescent competence
and the potential problems with mandated parental consent, have generally come
to similar conclusions.19 Thus, for example, the American Psychological Asso-
ciation has consistently disagreed with current adolescent abortion policies,
asserting. that such policies do not adequately consider psychological research in
areas that affect adolescent abortion.96
In one attempt to reform existing legislation, Ambuel mentions three possible
recommendations for public policy reform.197 First, he suggests that the age of
consent for abortion might be lowered from 18 to 14, thus incorporating
psychological research on adolescents' cognitive competency to consent to
abortion.' The proposal to lower the age of consent is echoed by others
reviewing both the informed consent competence and judgment of minors. 99
Others have proposed a more complicated sliding scale based upon the evalua-
tion of risk-benefit ratios.00 If policy makers will not lower the age of consent,
Ambuel proposes that counseling be provided as another alternative to mandato-
ry parental consent or notification and judicial review.20' Finally, he suggests
that all minors be deemed competent to make decisions important enough to
substantially affect their medical and psychological health. °2
Based on the existing psychological evidence, we also believe that all minors
between the ages of 14 and 17 should be presumed mature and competent if they
are able to knowingly, voluntarily, and reasonably discuss their decision. Inde-
pendent counselors should be provided to explain all options available to the
adolescent (i.e., abortion, adoption, and keeping the baby), to assess the minor's
consent, and to encourage parental involvement in cases where such involvement
is deemed both safe and supportive. In the absence of a parent, another support-
ive adult should be enlisted as a trusted mentor and long-term support person for
the teen. If a minor fails to meet the informed consent standards in discussions
of these options with counselors and medical professionals, judicial review
should be made available.
For minors below the age of 14, we recommend that parental consent be
required but that judicial bypass be provided where it is not in the best interest
of the child to consult with her parents, due to potential coercion, abuse, incest,
and so forth. Judicial bypass should be explained as an option by the on-site
counselor, and the procedures of the hearing should be clear to the minor.
194. G.V. Fleming, K.G. O'Connor, and J.M. Sanders, Pediatricians' Views of Access to
Health Services for Adolescents, 15 J Adolescent Health 473 (1994)..
195. ICAA, Adolescent Abortion at 74 (cited in note 161).
196. See id.
197. See Ambuel, 4 Current Directions in Psychological Science 1 (cited in note 156).
198. Id at 4.
199. See Billick, 14 Bull Am Academy Psychiatry & L 301 (cited in note 79); King, 23
J Family L 241 (cited in note 78).
200. Appelbaum and Grisso, 319 New Eng J Medicine at 1638 (cited in note 75);
Gaylin, Annual Prog in Child Psychiatry & Child Development (cited in note 16).
201. See Ambuel, 4 Current Directions in Psychological Science I (cited in note 156).
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Because it would be restricted for the most part to younger teens, judicial review
under this proposed regime should be more stringent than it is under the current
regime, where nearly all minors who seek the bypass are deemed sufficiently
mature.
Recognizing the interdependence of interests in juveniles' abortion choices,
we have attempted to avoid the temptation to find a single empirically derived
solution for the policy questions discussed. Parents have a right to be involved in
their children's decisions. In most cases, we presume that they will be involved
and that they will act in the best interest of their child. At the same time, we
recognize the privacy interests of adolescents as autonomous individuals, protect-
ed under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that parents are not always
able to act in their child's best interest. In the area of assessing minors' compe-
tence, there can be no singularly "best" balance among the child, family, and
state that social science can somehow divine or uncover. Instead, there are
multiple legitimate solutions, and one important role of social science should be
to document the effects of the different balances that could be struck. In this
way, research fosters debate about the values that might promote one policy
approach over another; it does not provide dispositive proof to settle the de-
bate.2"3
Is the current research clear enough or definitive enough to conclude that
juveniles are as competent as adults to make abortion decisions? No, it is not.
Thus, a better alternative conceptualization asks: Has the research conducted
since Danforth shown juveniles to be less competent than adults to make
competent abortion decisions?0 4 Again, the answer is no, because the current
body of knowledge regarding competence of minors is largely composed of null
findings. Without a clearer picture of exactly how and when decision-making
processes change in minors, however, researchers are in the difficult position of
arguing that null results constitute scientific findings."' 5 Simply put, the re-
search conducted over the past two decades suggests that adolescents are more
similar than dissimilar to adults in their decision-making, although some differ-
ences may exist. More research must directly compare minors and adults who
are confronting real abortion choices before we can be truly confident in under-
standing the differences in their decisions and the consequences of those deci-
sions. Given the current state of the research, in terms of both hypothetical
informed consent studies and more ecologically valid real-life decision studies, we
offer the recommendations above and question the recent and increasing legisla-
tive attempts to restrict the reproductive rights of adolescents.
203. Mulvey and Britner, Law and Mental Health Issues at 321 (cited in note 7).
204. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976).
205. See, for example, Gardner, Scherer, and Tester, 44 Am Psychologist at 899 (cited
in note 72); G. Melton, Adolescents and Prevention of AIDS, 19 Professional Psychology:
Research and Practice 403 (1988).
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